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Abstract: This article is about how easy a WTO case is when the defendant
concedes the claims, the description of the facts, and the evidence presented by the
complainant. In US–Zeroing (Korea), the United States did just that. We explore
whether Korea obtained any additional beneﬁt by having an easy case. We
identiﬁed some small beneﬁts at the preparation stage of the case arising from the
favourable precedents and shorter time frames only at the Panel stage. There were,
however, some additional costs for the complainant stemming from the Panel’s
reasoning when it addressed case law. In our opinion, beneﬁts were few. Korea
was obliged in any case to engage in two years of multilateral procedures before
three old measures, which were not defended by the defendant, were revoked.
At the 2012 American Law Institute conference on WTO law in Florence,
I discussed the case US–Zeroing (Korea)1 presented by Prusa and Rubini.
I developed two issues. First, how easy is a dispute where the defendant has
conceded the challenge by the complainant? Second, to what extent can WTO legal
remedies be applied retrospectively? The two questions are closely related. The ﬁrst
issue explores whether Korea obtained any additional beneﬁt by having an easy
case where the defendant conceded the complaint – i.e., US–Zeroing (Korea). As
the beneﬁt is small, the second issue takes on greater relevance: whether WTO legal
remedies may be applied retrospectively so as to cover part of the consequences of
the illegal measure, especially in cases where even the defendant conceded the
complaint. This article is about the ﬁrst element. The second is addressed in a
forthcoming separate article.
In US–Zeroing (Korea), the United States (US) knew before the judgment that
the measure was WTO illegal. This is conﬁrmed by the fact that it conceded the
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issues of law and the issues of fact presented by Korea in that dispute. Despite that,
the US maintained the anti-dumping (AD) duties and let Korea undertake the WTO
Dispute Settlement (DS) process before revoking the AD orders.
Korea claimed that the US applied zeroing in the three original investigations
of products coming from Korea. It alleged violation of Article 2.4.2 of the ADA
through the use of zeroing in the original investigations when determining
the dumping margin through the methodology of weighted average to weighted
average.2 The US did not contest Korea’s description of the zeroing methodology,
the evidence, or the legal claim.3 Also, strong and clear precedents supported
Korea’s case of violation.4
1. Upstream
Korea had to prepare evidence, study the measures, develop the claims, and assess
the case law before initiating the dispute. At the time of preparation of the case,
Korea did not know whether the US would concede its complaint. Had Korea
not presented the case properly, most probably the US would not have conceded
the complaint. This suggests that the case was not easier for Korea at the
preparatory stage.
But, Korea had the guidance from strong precedents that have ruled on identical
measures and claims.5 Certainly, this was an advantage when determining
sufﬁciency of evidence, and clarity of claims. But it was the precedents that gave
advantage and not the US–Zeroing (Korea) dispute itself.
2. Time table
First, the Panel eliminated the second substantive meeting with the parties after
consulting with them. This made the case shorter for Korea. We consider this to be
a beneﬁt.6
2 The products concerned were stainless-steel plate in coils (‘SSPC’), stainless-steel sheet and strip in
coils (‘SSSS’), and diamond sawblades. See US–Zeroing (Korea), paras. 1.1, 2.1, and 7.26.
3 A similar situation with respect to uncontested claims occurred in Panel Report, United
States –Antidumping Measures on Certain Shrimp and Diamond Sawblades from China, WT/DS422/R
and Add.1, adopted 23 July 2012. The Panel noted, at para. 7.5, that: ‘the panels inUS – Shrimp (Ecuador)
and, subsequently,US – Shrimp (Thailand), US –Anti-Dumping Measures on PET Bags, andUS –Zeroing
(Korea) were presented with a similar situation. Indeed each of these panels examined claims, unopposed
by the United States, that were virtually identical.’
4 See Panel Report in US–Zeroing (Korea), paras. 1.1, 3.2, and 7.27 and US communication dated
9 December 2011 (WT/DS402/7). Korea’s request for consultations was presented on 24 November 2009.
Its request for a Panel is from 8 April 2010. Finally, the US revoked the AD order on Steel Plate and Steel
Sheet in November 2011, and on Sawblades in December 2011.
5 See Panel Report in US –Zeroing (Korea), paras. 3.2 and 7.27.
6 See ibid., para. 1.6.
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Second, Figure 1 shows the overall time frames of the case at issue and the
average of WTO DS cases (based on information from Horn et al., 2011).7 The
only period that is signiﬁcantly shorter is the Panel stage. Seven months less is a
beneﬁt for Korea. But, no signiﬁcant beneﬁt is shown at the consultations stage, or
after a reasonable period of time (RPT).
3. Adjudication
There are some additional costs for Korea in the adjudicative Panel process. First,
the AB has indicated that adjudicators may use uncontested facts to draw a ruling
on the matter.8 But, the Panel decided not to follow such practice in order to
comply with the need for an objective assessment of the matter under Article 11 of
the DSU. If the AB uses undisputed facts to complete the legal analysis, this may
suggest that the AB does not consider that a violation of Article 11 of the DSU
occurs when a Panel draws on undisputed facts.
Second, the Panel decided not to categorize this undisputed matter as a mutually
agreed solution (MAS), as it was concerned to meet the obligation to make an
objective assessment under Article 11 of the DSU. This interpretation by the Panel
may wrongly suggest that if the parties agree that there is a violation and the Panel
reﬂects this in the Report, there is a risk of violation of Article 11 of the DSU.
Further research is needed on the scope of MAS and Panels’ treatment of
Figure 1. Overall time frames
Note: ‘Panel proc (est. to circ.)’ means Panel proceeding (establishment to circulation).
7 The averages are based on: Henrik Horn, Louise Johannesson, and Petros C.Mavroidis (2011), ‘The
WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995–2010: Some Descriptive Statistics’, 45:6 Journal of World Trade,
1107–1138.
8 See the Appellate Body Report in European Communities –Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/
AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, adopted 19 May 2005, DSR 2005:XIII, 6365, at para. 337. It
‘has declined to complete the legal analysis where “the factual ﬁndings of the panel and the undisputed facts
in the panel record” did not provide a sufﬁcient basis for the legal analysis by the Appellate Body’
(emphasis added).
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undisputed facts – already accepted by the AB – and undisputed claims, such as the
case at issue.
Finally, the Panel added a new step in determining a WTO violation. The Panel’s
test is whether the measure violates WTO law (see for instance Articles 7 and 19
of the DSU). The Panel covered that in two sections of its Report: whether the
US zeroed (para. 7.21 et seq.) and whether the zeroing methodology used is
inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the Antidumping Agreement (para. 7.28 et seq.).
But, it included an additional section on whether the methodology used by the US
in this case was the same as the one used in US–Softwood Lumber V, which
represented the strong precedent (para. 7.23 et seq.). It seems that the Panel inserted
an additional step for cases with strong precedents: the need to prove that the
two measures are the same. If this practice is adopted in future cases, there will be a
two-step process for cases without strong precedents and a three-step process for
cases with strong precedent.
4. Implementation
Table 1 shows the time frames on implementation. Two years from the request for
consultations to the revocation of the order seems a short period. As noted in
Table 1 above, the Panel procedure was faster than the average, which was a beneﬁt
for Korea. But, this is still far from perfect as revocation took two years of
multilateral procedures despite the fact that there was no disagreement by the
parties that the measure was WTO-illegal.
Finally, for two products, 13 years elapsed between the time of initiation of the
AD investigation and the revocation of the AD order; and, for the other product,
it was six years. The date of initiation of the AD order is relevant in light of
Table 1. Time frames on implementation
Order Initiation to revocation of AD Req. Consul.1 to revocation of AD
Steel Plate2 13 years 7 months 2 years
Steel Sheet3 13 years 4 months 2 years
Sawblades4 6 years 7 months 2 years 1 month
Notes:
1 Korea’s request for consultation is from November 2009.
2 For Steel Plate, the AD order was initiated in April 1998, and the revocation took place in
November 2011.
3 For Steel Sheet, the AD order was initiated in July 1998, and the revocation took place in
November 2011.
4 For Sawblades, the AD order was initiated in June 2005, and the revocation took place in
December 2011.
Source: Based on Thomas S. Prusa and Luca Rubini (2013), United States – Use of Zeroing in Anti-
Dumping Measures Involving Products from Korea: It’s déjà vu all over again, World Trade Review,
this issue.
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Article 5.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) that: ‘[a]n application . . . shall
be rejected and an investigation shall be terminated promptly as soon as the
authorities concerned are satisﬁed that there is not sufﬁcient evidence of . . .
dumping’. The investigations were not recent.
5. Conclusion
Korea was guided by a strong precedent in its favour – very useful as complainant –
and obtained a shorter Panel process. At the adjudicative stage, it had some extra
costs. The costs do not appear to be signiﬁcant in an easy case, but in complex cases
they could be onerous for a complainant. Finally, two years of multilateral
proceedings to revoke three old measures, where the defendant conceded the
complaint, calls for an assessment of WTO legal remedies. I agree with Prusa and
Rubini that there is a need for more studies on whether the WTO legal remedies
may be applied retrospectively.
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